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PRESSMAN v. ELGIN
than an equitable servitude, and thus it follows that the
contract theory tends to increase restrictions on the use
of property, for the more easily a restriction is enforced
the more readily it may be read into transfers of property.
On the other hand, adoption of the equitable easement
doctrine has the effect of lessening restrictions on the use
of property because of the formalities required in creating
them. The decision in the Scholtes case and the ruling in
Matthews v. Kernewood20 indicate that only the most posi-
tive evidence of a general plan is strong enough to justify
the enforcement of restrictions on use and occupancy in
Maryland. Such an attitude is consistent with the equita-
ble servitudes theory of restrictive covenants.
ATTORNEY'S RIGHT TO INSPECT MOTOR VEHICLE
ACCIDENT REPORTS
Pressman v. Elgin1
Petitioner-appellant, a member of the Bar, brought the
present mandamus proceeding against defendant-appellee,
the State Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, to compel the
latter to keep open for public inspection the reports of
motor vehicle accidents received by him. The trial court
denied the petition but, on appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed and held the petitioner entitled to inspect the
records, subject to necessary amendment as to the scope of
his request.2
The Court held that the older provision of the Motor
Vehicle law8 which required the Commissioner to permit
public inspection of all statements filed with him prevailed
over the later provision of the Financial Responsibility
Act,4 which merely provided that the compulsory reports
required of motorists concerning accidents should not be
admissible in evidence, nor otherwise referred to, in any
damage suit litigation concerning the accident reported.
The decision in the principal case suggests some inter-
esting considerations of the ideas of policy underlying the
10 Supra, n. 9.
' 50 A. 2d 560 (Md. 1947).
2 Petitioner was held entitled to inspect only the public records on file
at the time of the granting of the prayer, whereas his petition included
those thereafter to be filed, 50 A. 2d 560, 564.
a Md. Code Supp. (1943) Art. 66%, Sec. 12, formerly Md. Code (1939)
Art. 56, Sec. 149.
4 Md. Laws 1945, Ch. 456, Art. 66%, Secs. 10A, 10H.
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various rules of evidence which are concerned. Let us
first consider, in order to provide a background, (A) the
general law as to the accessibility of official records to
public inspection, (B) the established media of proving
them in court if made accessible and if admissible in evi-
dence when so made, and (C) by what evidential basis
these compulsory reports from motorists might be admissi-
ble in evidence, were it not so that the statute specifically
forbids such more extensive use of them than was herein
sought.
In general, but for specific rules of privilege stemming
from the common or statute law, official records are held to
be open to public inspection.' In fact, the older statutory
provision here involved specifically reiterated that proposi-
tion, so that the particular point was whether the later
one, privileging the reports from use in evidence, also re-
pealed the right of inspection.
When an official record is both open to public inspection
and admissible in evidence the traditional method of prov-
ing it in litigation is by a properly certified copy, unless it
be a record of the same court, in which case the original
record is exhibited, or from an agency not having a seal,
in which case production and proof of the original, if possi-
ble, or testimony of a witness as to its contents must be
used.6 In fact, there is some authority that a certified copy
must be used, at least for the records of another court than
the sitting one, possibly for any agency having power to
certify, so that the originals thereof, or private copies made
by witnesses may not be used. But it is not the purpose of
this note directly to go into the details of the above prob-
lems.
Finally, the question arises, how is it that these com-
pulsory reports by motorists would be admissible in evi-
dence, if made accessible and if not privileged, when prop-
erly proved by whatever device was appropriate? What
of the hearsay rule? But for the explicit statutory privi-
lege, such reports could be offered in evidence by the re-
porting motorist's adversary on the basis of their consti-
tuting evidential admissions. Thus, the hearsay rule ob-
jection would be surmounted under that principle, just as
5 There is a full discussion of the right of the public to inspect official
records in 45 Am. Jur., Records and Recording Laws, Sees. 14-27. And
see also 60 A. L. R. 1356 (Enforceability by mandamus of right to inspect
public records) ; 102 A. L. R. 756 (Right to examine records or documents
of municipality relating to public utility conducted by it): 108 A. L. R.
1395 (Right to examine and copy automobile records).
1 Hahn v. State. 52 A. 2d 113 (Md. 1947).
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for any statement of one's adversary offered as an admis-
sion.7
But for this specific privilege there would be no objec-
tion to the use of such statements as admissions merely
because of the compulsory nature of making them. The
normal rule is that compulsion or duress is no obstacle to
the admissibility of any evidential admission,' save in the
sole instance of a formal confession of guilt offered against
a criminal defendant.9 Save for confessions, the objection
of duress is thought only to go to the weight rather than
the admissibility of the admission. The exceptional rule
for confessions by the traverser is to be explained by the
greater than usual damaging effect of such a complete ad-
mission.'0
Despite the general rule that there is no objection,
based on compulsion, to the admissibility of a casual ad-
mission, some specific rules, usually statutory, have been
provided in order to privilege statements or reports made
under compulsion. These must be distinguished from the
impact of the privilege against self-incrimination, which,
when applicable, privileges against making the statements
at all, rather than against their use, if made."
A first type is the one in the pending case, whereby the
citizen is required to report something probably not in-
criminating, but is protected against the court room use
of what he does report. The policy of this is to encourage
him to be as complete and accurate as he might be, with-
out fear of being unduly damaged by the use of his report
against him in litigation.
7 4 WIGMOR, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) Sec. 1048.
'4 WIGmosA, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) Sees. 815, 1050.
Ibid.
10 This distinction between formal confessions and casual admissions
leads to neat points of distinction, as In People v. Wynekoop, 359 Ill. 124.
194 N. E. 276 (1934), where the prosecution was allowed to prove a formal
statement taken from the accused, without a preliminary hearing as to its
voluntariness, as would have been necessary for a confession, which state-
ment by Itself exculpated the accused but which was offered by the State
along with other inconsistent ones as showing an attempt to fabricate as
to the cause of the victim's death.
11 Cf. Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Sec. 4 which provides that In all criminal
cases the party accused Is not to be a witness unless he so requests and
that "the neglect or refusal of any such person to testify shall not create
any presumptions against him": and Art. 35, Sec. 7, apparently broader,
for It stipulates that "In the trial of any civil suit, action or proceeding,
no evidence shall be admissible to prove that any party thereto neglected
or refused to testify in any criminal proceeding involving the same trans-
action, occurrence or subject matter." These differ from the privilege not
to testify or answer in that such privilege prevents the witness from having
to make a statement that might constitute a personal admission, where the
statutes protect against the claim of the privilege being showable as an
admission by conduct, I. e., by the suppression of evidence.
19441
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A second type frequently does just the opposite of what
the Court ruled to be the law concerning motor vehicle
reports. It may be required for the recipient to keep the
information confidential and away from public scrutiny
except where-necessary to be used in litigation.12  This
method may be more appropriate for trade secrets and the
like, where it is recognized that the public interest in valid
decision of court cases provides the only reason for breach-
ing the confidence.
A third type has more to do with the privilege against
self-incrimination, and the problem of relaxing that privi-
lege, in order to compel an implicated person to testify
against others also guilty. For example, the Maryland
Liquor laws, which punish both the bartender, who sells
to a minor, and the minor who buys, provide that a minor
may be compelled to testify against the bartender on the
latter's trial, but that his testimony may not be used
against him if he is himself later tried."3 There is some
doubt of the constitutionality of this type of provision, and
some authority that nothing short of complete immunity
from prosecution will suffice to make this compulsion con-
stitutional.14  Such complete immunity has been provided
by Maryland statutes applicable to gambling, 15 conspir-
acy, 0 and other crimes. 17
In fact, some doubt on this score has been thrown on the
compulsion of reports of accidents from motorists, as well
as on the compulsory disclosure of name and address at
the scene of an accident, but there is case law's upholding
the constitutionality of such requirements, and no such
question seems to have been raised about the Maryland
requirements of this sort. 9
1" Md. Code (1939) Art. 11, Sec. 23 so provides for confidential informa-
tion obtained by the Bank Commissioner and his staff.
"'Md. Code (1939) Art. 56, Sec. 93. See also Md. Code (1939) Art. 75,
Sec. 149.1, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd ed. 1940) Sec. 2283.
1 Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 304.
1Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, See. 43.
11 See Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 27, dealing with bribery and Art.
27, Sec. 420, dealing with lotteries. Consider also Md. Code (1939) Art.
IA, Sec. 18; ibid. Art. 48A, Sees. 42, 45, 228, and ibid. Art. 101, Sec. 7.
" Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N. E. 140 (1935) ; Ex parte Kneedler,
243 Mo. 632, 147 S. W. 983 (1912) ; State v. Sterrin, 78 N. H. 220, 98 Atl.
482 (1916) ; People v. Rosenheimer, 128 N. Y. Supp. 1093, 130 N. Y. Supp.
544, 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530 (1913).
19 However, compare the cases of Downs v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 At.
653 (1909) where the Court of Appeals held that the Police Commissioner
of Baltimore City may photograph and measure a person charged with a
felony before he is tried but cannot put his photograph in the rogues'
gallery unless he has been convicted; and the case of Allen v. State, 183
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An earlier Maryland case having to do with the usabil-
ity in evidence of compulsory reports of accidents was
Weissman v. Hokamp.2 ° This case might be relevant in
connection with an incidental problem not before the
Court in the principal one. It involved the admissibility
in evidence of a compulsory report by a taxi-cab driver,
which report was required both under the Public Service
Commission law,2' and another older provision of the
motor vehicle law, 22 (still in force as slightly changed in
the meanwhile)23 both of which called for reports of acci-
dents. The Public Service Commission section specifically
privileged the report from use in evidence, but the motor
vehicle law section did not. The Court found no error in
allowing its use because, even though privileged by the
former law, it was permissible to be used under the latter.
Inasmuch as the latter section was apparently not re-
pealed24 by the Financial Responsibility Act, it might be
remarked, by the principle of the above case, that any re-
port now made, and required to be made, both 25 under the
old provision and the Financial Responsibility Section
would, therefore, be admissible, despite the Financial Re-
sponsibility provision's attempt to privilege such report
from use in evidence.
Be that as it may, the doctrine of the principal case con-
cerning the privilege of parties, or their counsel, of inspect-
ing the records for whatever clues they can obtain, seems
a sound one. It is inevitable that some public use will be
made of such reports, at least, by the Commissioner in di-
recting whether to revoke a license, and it would be
ludicrous to deprive adverse parties of such sources of in-
formation as they might obtain. It seems a sufficient
guaranty to the reporting motorist that he shall be immune
Md. 603, 39 A. 2d 820 (1944) which held that a defendant in a criminal
case could not be required to try on a hat found at the scene of the crime
and concededly worn by the culprit, in order to prove his ownership of it.
20 171 Md. 197, 188 A. 923 (1936).
21 Md. Code (1939) Art. 23, Sec. 380.
22 Md. Code (1939) Art. 56, Sec. 198.
"Md. Laws 1943, Ch. 1007 repealed Art. 56, Secs. 145-239A. Whereas
Art. 56, Sec. 198 had required reports of all accidents resulting in injury
to any person, Md. Laws 1943, Ch. 1007, Sec. 150 (Md. Code Supp., Art.
66Y2, Sec. 150) required reports of accidents resulting in total property
damage to an apparent extent of $100 or more as well as those resulting in
personal injury or death.
24 Unless, as might be, the doctrine of implied repeal be applied, in which
case the speculation in the text is irrelevant..
25 Under Md. Laws 1945, Ch. 456, Sec. 110A reports of accidents must be
made where there is death or injury, or property damage in excess of $50
Is sustained by any one person. Thus, save for property damage only be-
tween $50 and $100, all reports come under both laws.
1944]
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from the greater damage from having his report offered
against him in the court room. But it does not seem neces-
sary to go further and protect him against his adversary's
locating such otherwise admissible evidence as he might,
if he is to have the benefit of inspecting the compulsory re-
port.
The rule of the principal case that permits inspection,
even if it is not permitted to offer the report in evidence
against the reporting motorist, achieves in substance a
species of discovery practice, and merely adds another
technique of that useful procedure.26
The upshot of the situation under the Court's ruling is
to assimilate the matter to the rule which prevails both in
State and Federal courts concerning evidence obtained
illegally, or by unconstitutional search and seizure. In
State misdemeanor cases under the Bouse Act, 27 and in all
Federal criminal cases, under the doctrine of the Weeks
case,28 evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure can-
not be used as evidence in court.29 So it is with the com-
pulsory motorist's report under the Financial Responsi-
bility Act.
But the State and Government are permitted to pursue
their clues they obtain from the evidence they may have
wrongfully seized and to offer any admissible evidence
they can locate. So it is that under the doctrine of this case
the motorist's adversary is privileged to obtain clues from
the compulsory report, and to offer such admissible evi-
dence other than the report as he may be able to obtain
after inspecting the report itself.
'"The difference is, of course, that typical discovery relates to com-
pulsory disclosure by the adversary of something in his control.
27 Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Sec. 5.
's Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep.
341 (1914).
29 The difference is that, under the Federal practice, the evidence illegally
obtained is suppressed by pre-trial motion for its return, and under the
State practice it is merely made inadmissible if and when offered at trial,
Sugarman v. State, 173 Md. 52, 195 A. 324 (1937), noted (1938) 2 Md. L.
Rev. 147; and State v. Mariana, 174 Md. 85, 197 A. 620 (1938), noted
(1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 303.
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